In sub-Saharan Africa about 140 million people live with the constant threat of droughts or floods. Prevailing uncertainty and the absence of financial safety nets makes it difficult for poor farmers to make higher-risk, higher-return investments. Then, when the rains fail, vulnerable households act fast. Immediate response strategies include selling nonproductive assets or migration of family members. However, if the situation does not improve, they are forced to use more costly coping strategies, like removing children from school, reducing food consumption and health expenditures, and selling productive assets, such as farming tools and livestock (Barnett et al. 2006; Hess et al. 2006) .
By the time humanitarian aid reaches the poor, the majority have already lost key assets and livelihoods, and therefore their ability to benefit from better weather the following year (WFP 2006) . According to the World Bank and the World Food Programme (WFP) this response 'delay' under an ex post emergency model, accounts for large numbers of new destitute people after a climate-related disaster. After losing their productive assets, these newly poor are often trapped in a state of dependency on external aid for many years (Hess et al. 2006; Morris 2005) , and risk moving from temporary poverty to being chronically poor.
In this scenario, humanitarian assumptions have started to be questioned: are our response mechanisms working or will the reinforcement of old practices become a risk for the poor? Do we need to find a more effective and sustainable way to approach weather risk and humanitarian assistance? In response to these questions, innovative models are now being considered and tested (Pelling 2007 ).
This article looks at weather insurance schemes recently piloted at the micro-and macro-levels, and assesses their potential as tools for social protection. It highlights the challenges of and differences between the two approaches, and looks at the opportunities for improved targeting and local participation.
Key findings are that weather-based microinsurance ultimately targets relatively better off farmers and is not an appropriate tool for broad social protection targeting all poor groups. Macroinsurance policies in support of existing social protection programmes appear to have more potential in reaching the most vulnerable. By providing timely and predictable aid after a severe drought, disaster insurance can have an important role in saving the livelihoods of transiently food-insecure people. (Skees et al. 1999) , considering not only the high monitoring and administrative costs, but also the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard; since once insured, farmers often lose the incentive to minimise their loss by investing in risk reduction. Therefore, traditional crop insurance has been seen as a poor model for export, particularly for developing countries, most of which are under serious fiscal constraints and have smallholder economies highly exposed to the risk of simultaneous losses from a single event (Morduch 2001) .
Recently, due to the introduction of a new approach to crop insurance with index-based products, an opportunity for improving vulnerable communities' resilience has arisen: through close integration of disaster risk reduction with risk transfer tools there is a chance to create a viable insurance market in developing countries and to provide a mechanism for financing safety net and disaster relief programmes in countries where climate variability constitutes a major risk (Pelling 2007; Barnett et al. 2006 ).
3 Index-based risk transfer products Index-based insurance is still a relatively new tool and more research is necessary to fully comprehend its potential and limitations. Unlike traditional insurance, contracts are written on a physical trigger (i.e. rainfall measurements at a local weather station) that acts as a proxy for crop losses a farmer experiences in his field, rather than using his actual losses to determine a claim. Since no field inspections are required, there is a drastic reduction of transaction costs and claims can be paid promptly. Moreover, as the index is based on objectively measurable data, there are few asymmetric information problems and the index can be transferred directly to international financial markets (Morris 2005; Mechler et al. 2006; Davies et al., this IDS Bulletin) .
The drawback is that significant investments in the start-up phase are necessary to develop these schemes, and international reinsurance companies may be reluctant to cover these costs. Therefore, some aid agencies and governmental organisations have started piloting these schemes to explore their potential.
Index-based schemes can be implemented at microor macro-level. The micro-model offers protection to weather risks that have direct impact on a farmer's agricultural production. The macro-model focuses on risk at an aggregate level and when crop production is affected at a regional, national or multi-country level. Usually, these initiatives aim to meet different policy objectives and target different segments of the rural population with different risk profiles than the micro-models. Both models pose different challenges with regard to local participation and targeting.
4 A micro approach to index-based insurance To date, only a few micro-level policies have been implemented.
2 These models require a big initial investment for the start-up phase, primarily to collect the necessary data to establish the index, but can become self-sustainable when the project scales up and a big pool of insured people (generally more than 10,000) is created.
3 These micro policies can be sold to individual farmers or to groups, like a cooperative or an entire village, and can also offer protection for localised weather risks (Mechler et al. 2006) .
As highlighted at the 2007 ProVention Forum, major challenges to this approach are the threat that large covariant losses can pose to the financial stability of insurers and the prevailing absence of an institutional architecture to pull risk transfer and risk reduction together (Pelling 2007) . One of the key lessons learnt to date is that investment in microinsurance without complementary investment in financial intermediaries and effective marketing channels and supply chains, where linkages can be made, will limit the take-up and scalability of such initiatives (UN DESA 2007).
In fact, as the Malawi experience highlights (see Box 1), in order for this insurance to work, other risks faced by farmers (such as access to market and to credit) need to be addressed. Moreover, to date, the most financially sustainable examples of weather microinsurance have been where insurance is offered as part of a broader portfolio of policies (as done in the BASIX scheme). Technical issues can represent another limitation. Since this type of insurance has to capture local weather events on a farmer's field, a large number of weather stations are necessary.
These characteristics of micro policies pose significant challenges for the targeting of areas and communities where services like market, insurance providers and diffused weather stations are absent and, for different reasons, difficult to develop.
Targeting and participation
In principle, this model is able to offer protection to different categories of the poor (not only farmers but also landless and pastoralist communities), making it potentially more relevant than traditional crop insurance. The index-based approach at the micro-level also suggests a higher degree of transparency and can limit corruption. A key requisite for transparency and accountability of these schemes, however, is a community's active involvement in managing the insurance, as it will directly determine the levels of responsibility the community is willing to assume for the success or failure of the scheme (Pierro and Desai 2007 ).
However, a major challenge is the affordability of commercial insurance for the poor (Pelling 2007) . Experience from Malawi and India suggests that micro weather insurance may not be an appropriate solution for very poor rural communities and for the poorest parts of the population. In fact, staff from World Bank involved in developing such schemes point out that these products focus on increasing the productivity and profitability of less poor farmers, which is why they are often bundled with credit and input supplies. 5 Basis risk (that occurs when the trigger is insufficiently correlated with the losses and no payout is given even though losses occurred), combined with 'perceived' basis risk can make this tool unsuitable for the poorest. People for which the payment of a premium can already be a heavy burden, could lose any incentive after experiencing a loss that is not covered by the policy (for instance crop loss due to pest attack). They could perceive the insurance as a fraud and decide not to renew the policy for the future. Only people with some assets to protect and certain levels of financial liquidity will be able and willing to pay the premium on a regular basis. These limitations are likely to determine difficulties in targeting subsistence farmers who face multiple risks, and make this tool inappropriate for social protection.
There is still a lack of information on what is necessary for the poor to fully benefit from this tool. According to Christian Aid programme staff for instance, the presence of empowered communities and the absence of conflict are crucial conditions (Pierro and Desai 2007) . Additional factors are an affordable premium, the simplicity of the scheme and broad coverage. However, local culture could strongly interfere with the viability of these schemes and the willingness of people to pay for the premium: lack of trust in top-down interventions and a lack of incentives, resources and energy can present significant barriers.
Understanding the poor's expectations of benefits from the insurance, and building their trust through improved transparency of the scheme will be crucial for its success. Certainly, more research and pilot studies are necessary to explore how this tool can affect power relations within a village, including the effects it may have on people unable to join the scheme and on gender relations within a household. 5 A macro approach to index-based insurance A different approach to index-based insurance is currently being piloted at the macro-level, through national and multi-country policies. These schemes
Box 1 NASFAM in Malawi
Small-scale peanut farmers in Malawi are generally unable to buy high-quality seeds that are more resistant to drought on a regular basis. In 2005, to make them more creditworthy, NASFAM (a farmers' association) with technical assistance from the World Bank and Opportunity International, designed a pilot index-based insurance scheme. Multiple underwriters were necessary since no single underwriter was willing to take the risk alone, given the huge payout in the event of a drought. In the first season, 892 farmers bought the insurance; they were small farmers with an average of one acre of land (Opportunity International 2005).
However, farmers experienced a low harvest due to the seed quality they received. The seeds provided by NASFAM were too old, producing poor yields and resulting in an inability by participating farmers to repay their loans. 4 This experience shows that microinsurance can be a tool in disaster mitigation only if the coupled services are functioning well.
appear to be suitable for low-probability, highconsequence weather risks.
The first National Disaster Insurance was implemented in Ethiopia in 2006 while the first Multi-country Disaster Insurance was implemented in the Caribbean in 2007. In these policies, the contract is written between governments, donors and a reinsurance company. This policy would guarantee national governments a reliable payout as soon as an insured disaster strikes. The World Bank, WFP and Department for International Development (DFID) have been involved in its promotion and pilot, helping national stakeholders to build capacity that would enable them to link with international financial markets.
Macroinsurance is easier to implement than microinsurance, since it involves only few insured entities (governments and development agencies), which can deal with basis risk more easily than individual farmers can. Covering only severe weather events, it does not require as large a number of weather stations to be implemented successfully as microinsurance (only about 26 weather stations were sufficient to cover the whole of Ethiopia).
Moreover, disaster insurance, seen as a national adaptive mechanism to climate change, could offer the basis for a rights-based approach to climate change. For instance, models could be developed where subsidies to the insurance's premium would be provided by high carbon-producing countries as part of compensatory schemes for adaptation in countries affected by climate change; managed through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) Adaptation Fund.
During the 2007 ProVention Forum, some key challenges have been identified for this macro approach: financial sustainability of insurance products, creating incentives for risk reduction, and difficulty in eroding local markets and exacerbating social It needs to be part of a broader contingency plan, inequalities (Pelling 2007) since it can only cover catastrophic risk (not small-scale It seems transferable to other countries with disasters) available historical and up-to-date weather data.
It is not capable of addressing all types of The World Bank is also exploring the opportunity humanitarian crisis (e.g. conflicts). Therefore, as a social for using Satellite Imaging protection tool, it needs to be part of a broader set of It will create or reinforce the idea that the state emergency response mechanisms (Barnett et al. 2006 ) has responsibilities to ensure its citizens' safety and It can replace losses but cannot be a substitute for protection of their livelihoods (Pelling 2007) job creation, for market access, or education that did It can guarantee greater dignity for the not exist in the first place beneficiaries than aid appeals (Syroka and Wilcox 2006) Complexity of cost-benefit analysis If weather data collected are openly shared, they can be valuable for any disaster risk reduction programme It could offer a basis for a rights-based approach to climate change finding a balance of public-private roles. Additionally, there is the technical challenge of generating reliable historical and updated meteorological data while developing effective climate change scenarios to use as the basis for estimating future risk (Table 1) .
The aim of currently tested macro-level schemes, such as the Ethiopia pilot, are to explore whether it is feasible to use market tools to finance drought risk, and to prove that accurate indicators can be developed to trigger drought assistance. While in that respect the Ethiopia pilot appears to have been successful, key challenges for its implementation remain targeting and participation.
Targeting and participation
A study carried out on the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) shows that overall, the programme reaches the poor and food-insecure but that the level of transparency and accountability varied greatly across the region. Several problems have been highlighted, for instance bad timing of public work in some areas, overlapping of membership of the targeting and appeals bodies and some gender issues (Sharp et al. 2006) . According to Christian Aid staff, the top-down approach of these national programmes is creating conflict with local civil society. Local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not involved in the identification and planning of public work projects and the large scale of these projects often undermines the viabilities of smaller local projects.
8
For the disaster insurance scheme, the WFP and the Government of Ethiopia's Food Security Bureau designed an Implementation Rulebook, modelled on and complementary to the PSNP, describing targeting guidelines for cash-for-work or food-for-work projects (Hess et al. 2006 , WFP 2006 . The combination of community-based and administrative targeting systems laid out in the rulebook should help to ensure a certain degree of community participation and ownership. However, to date there is no information about participation levels and targeting outcomes in the Ethiopia insurance scheme as it has only been piloted once and no payout has occurred to date.
From the Ethiopia pilot, it emerges that for drought insurance to be affordable, can only cover catastrophic droughts and needs to be coordinated with a safety net programme (like the PSNP), targeting people exposed also to chronic risk. But drought insurance can enhance and increase the sustainability of social protection systems that aim to reach the poorest during emergencies. More research is required to better understand the different opportunities for disaster insurance in covering other weather risks besides droughts and in targeting people with different levels of vulnerability.
Conclusions
Index-based weather insurance is still at a pilot stage and many questions remain unanswered. More research and comparison among different projects is required to understand the feasibility of this approach,
Drought insurance in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, the emergency system recently underwent a major reform. Starting in 2005, the government introduced the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), a predictable and increasingly cash-based model targeting the chronically food-insecure. However, this partial reform of the emergency system did not appear to be financially sustainable, since it did not include an effective mechanism to protect livelihoods of the transiently food-insecure people. They remained at risk of losing their assets during future crises, risking an unsustainable growth of the chronically foodinsecure community and therefore the PSNP.
Then in 2006, the first National Disaster Insurance was piloted by the WFP and AXA Re. in Ethiopia, targeting the transiently food-insecure community (Hess et al. 2006) . While the pilot provides only a small amount of contingency funding, covering 310,000 beneficiaries with a maximum payout of $7.1 million, the model is calibrated to potentially assist 17 million Ethiopian farmers who risk destitution as a consequence of a severe drought (Syroka and Wilcox 2006) . The insurance will be part of an Early Livelihood Protection Facility, combining a Contingency Fund (up to $50 million) for very mild droughts, an additional Contingency Grant (up to $40 million) for mild droughts and additional Disaster Insurance provision (up to $60 million) for severe droughts (Hess et al. 2006 
